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Abstract
The previous twelve turnout rates of French national elections by municipality show regularities.
These regularities do not depend on the national turnout level, nor on the nature of the election.
Based on past statistical regularities we make three predictions. The first one deals with the standard
deviation of the turnout rate by municipality. The second one refers to the continuity in time of the
heterogeneity of turnout rates in the vicinity of a municipality. The last one is about the correlation
between the heterogeneity of turnout rates in the vicinity of a municipality and the population in
its surroundings. Details, explanations and discussions will be given in forthcoming papers.
Most of the empirical electoral studies made by physicists deal with proportional voting from multiple choice
lists, and investigate the distribution of votes ; as in Brazil [1, 2, 3, 4], in Brazil and India [5], in India and
Canada [6], in Mexico [7, 8], in Indonesia [9]. A universal behavior is seen in [10]. Statistical results of elections
for city mayor, focused on few candidates, are studied in [11], typology of Russian elections in [12], a correlation
between electoral results and party members in Germany in [13], and statistics of votes per cabin for three
Mexican elections in [14].
In this paper, we are interested in a probably simpler phenomenon: the participation in elections. Table A-1
shows the previous twelve French national elections for which we know the turnout rate for each of the approx-
imately 36200 municipalities (called “communes” in French)1. It is worth to stress that for each one of these
elections (first or second presidential round, referendum, European Parliament), the choice list is the same for
the whole country2. This investigation is restricted to metropolitan France.
The three predictions are produced by statistical regularities observed over the previous twelve elections,
while global turnout rates stretch from 31% up to 85%. Moreover, these elections are not of the same nature. A
standard deviation (sigma) is measured, and a prediction is made with an arbitrary two sigma error bar. Note
that for each one of the three regularities, data do not seem to show any global shift during the studied fifteen
year period.
1 Standard deviation of τα
Let α be a municipality, with Nα registered voters, of whom Nα+ take part in the election, and the remaining
Nα− do not (N
α = Nα+ +N
α
−). In order to compare in an easier way elections with different turnout levels, let
us define the unbounded value for one municipality α:
τα = ln
( Nα+
Nα−
)
. (1)
τα > 0 means that the usual turnout rate
Nα+
Nα
is greater than 50%. To prevent τα from diverging, we modify
real values by 12 when necessary. (If N
α
− = 0, then N
α
− → 12 , Nα+ → Nα − 12 ; and if Nα+ = 0, then Nα+ → 12 ,
Nα− → Nα − 12 .)
∗Electronic address: christian.borghesi@cea.fr
1Data are from the bureau des e´lections et des e´tudes politiques of the French Home Office, kindly given by Brigitte Hazart,
who I would like to especially thank for the great work she did.
2This is strictly true in all elections considered, excepted in the 2004 and the future 2009 European Parliament elections, in
which there are seven different choice lists over metropolitan France. In the latter case, the main political parties propose candidates
in each of the seven regions. Nevertheless, we assume that, regarding voter turnout, it is not a great mistake to assimilate these
seven lists to a single one.
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Figure 1: Histograms of τα − 〈τ 〉, for the twelve elec-
tions. 〈τ 〉 means the average value of τα over the
approximately 36200 municipalities α of metropolitan
France. The letter b (or m) added to the election year
indicates that the choice list is binary (or multiple). For
more information about elections, see Tab. A-1. The
inset shows the histograms of the turnout rate
Nα+
Nα
per
municipality.
92-b 94-m 95-m 95-b 99-m 00-b 02-m 02-b 04-m 05-b 07-m 07-b
0.355 0.398 0.375 0.398 0.392 0.377 0.347 0.367 0.366 0.351 0.396 0.394
Table 1: Standard deviation of τα over all the municipalities. The mean value and the standard deviation over the
twelve elections are respectively equal to 0.376 and 0.019.
Fig. 1 shows centered histograms of τα for the twelve elections studied. The centered distribution (τα−〈τ〉)
seems to be similar for the twelve different elections. It is worth to stress that the similarity of the τα distribution
cannot be explained by a simple binomial distribution, where Nα+ is obtained by the successes of N
α independent
events with probability p. (According to the binomial distribution hypothesis, the probability p is the same for
all the municipalities, and its value, which depends on the considered election, is equal to the global turnout
rate given in Tab. A-1.) Note that other unbounded values, e.g. −erfc(−1)(2N
α
+
Nα
), can also lead to similar
centered distributions for the twelve different elections. We choose the definition given in Eq. (1) because of its
simplicity.
Here, we are just interested in the standard deviation of the τα distribution, which can easily be measured,
and thus predicted. Tab. 1 gives the standard deviation of τα over all the municipalities α, for each election.
Thus, the predicted standard deviation of τα over all the municipalities becomes:
Previous measures Expected measure
Standard deviation of τα 0.376± 0.019 [0.338; 0.414]
(In the above table, Previous measures is written as (mean± standard deviation), like in the next two
similar ones.)
It can be interesting to compare the turnout rate of a central municipality α to its environment, defined
as the nv municipalities β in the vicinity of α [15, 16]. This environment, i.e. the set of the nv different τ
β ,
can be characterized by its mean value, and also by its standard deviation. In order to take into account more
properly the standard deviation of the environment, we define it as a constant number nv (the same for each
central municipality) of the nearest neighbor municipalities of a central municipality. It appears that generally,
this standard deviation, called here σα0 , i.e. the heterogeneity of the environment of a central municipality α,
remains relatively stable for each election. More precisely, the correlation over all the central municipalities α
between σα0 at two different elections, is relatively high (around 0.6), and does not fluctuate a lot for different
couples of elections.
2 Correlation of σα0 at different elections
Consider the nv = 16 nearest neighbor municipalities of a central municipality α. Note that the location of a
municipality is reduced to the location of its town hall3. These nv municipalities have an estimated standard
deviation of their turnout rates, written as:
σα0 =
√
1
nv − 1
∑
β
(τβ − τα0 )2 , (2)
where β is one of the nv = 16 municipalities, and τ
α
0 =
1
nv
∑
β τ
β .
The correlation of σα0 for all the α municipalities at two different elections, at time ti and tj , is written as
Cti,tj (σ0). (Cti,tj (σ0) =
〈σα0 (ti)σ
α
0 (tj)〉−〈σ
α
0 (ti)〉〈σ
α
0 (tj)〉√
〈[σα
0
(ti)−〈σα0 (ti)〉]
2〉
√
〈[σα
0
(tj)−〈σα0 (tj)〉]
2〉
, where σα0 (ti) and σ
α
0 (tj) respectively mean σ
α
0
3Le Repertoire Ge´ographique des Communes by l’Institut Ge´ographique National provides latitude and longitude coordinates
of the town hall of each municipality for 1999.
http://professionnels.ign.fr/ficheProduitCMS.do?idDoc=5323862
2
at times ti and tj , and 〈...〉 means the average value over the α municipalities.) Table 2 gives Cti,tj (σ0) for
every couple of different elections ti 6= tj .
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
ti
tj 94-m 95-m 95-b 99-m 00-b 02-m 02-b 04-m 05-b 07-m 07-b
1992-b 0.636 0.602 0.600 0.597 0.559 0.501 0.521 0.543 0.515 0.484 0.520
1994-m 0.609 0.595 0.686 0.607 0.524 0.509 0.603 0.535 0.463 0.505
1995-m 0.732 0.607 0.555 0.551 0.549 0.554 0.531 0.507 0.535
1995-b 0.605 0.547 0.537 0.554 0.556 0.524 0.500 0.536
1999-m 0.697 0.589 0.570 0.700 0.592 0.510 0.551
2000-b 0.552 0.546 0.662 0.542 0.485 0.532
2002-m 0.694 0.581 0.557 0.499 0.535
2002-b 0.566 0.572 0.530 0.574
2004-m 0.642 0.535 0.575
2005-b 0.567 0.600
2007-m 0.704
Table 2: Cti,tj (σ0) for all the couples of different elections. The mean value and the standard deviation are respectively
equal to 0.567 and 0.058.
Thus, the predicted 112
∑12
i=1 Cti,tj (σ0), where i is one of the previous twelve elections and j the next European
Parliament election, becomes:
Previous measures Expected measure
Cti,tj (σ0) 0.567± 0.058 [0.451; 0.683]
The dispersion of turnout rates in the surroundings of a municipality shows a constant behavior in time.
We will now see its connection with the population in the vicinity of the municipality.
3 Correlation between σα0 and pi
α
0
Finite size effects are partially included in σα0 , and are due to the finite size of the population of the nv
municipalities that define σα0 . These finite size effects can be taken into account by the value pi
α
0 , written as:
piα0 =
√
1
nv
∑
β
1
Nβ
, (3)
where β means one of the nv = 16 nearest neighbor municipalities of a central municipality α. According to
Eq. (2), Nα+ obtained by the successes ofN
α independent events with probability p (i.e. a binomial distribution),
provides σα0 proportional to pi
α
0 (see Fig. 2).
Fig. 2 shows σα0 as a function of pi
α
0 for each election. There is a clear connection between σ
α
0 and pi
α
0 , that
can be evidenced by their correlation. Table 3 gives for each election the correlation between σα0 and pi
α
0 over
all the central municipalities α.
92-b 94-m 95-m 95-b 99-m 00-b 02-m 02-b 04-m 05-b 07-m 07-b
0.636 0.633 0.665 0.662 0.661 0.677 0.615 0.635 0.679 0.609 0.610 0.663
Table 3: Correlation between σα0 and pi
α
0 over all the central municipalities α, and for the twelve elections. The mean
value and the standard deviation are respectively equal to 0.645 and 0.026.
Thus, the predicted correlation between σα0 and pi
α
0 becomes:
Previous measures Expected measure
Correlation between σα0 and pi
α
0 0.645± 0.026 [0.593; 0.697]
To conclude, we have been interested in a relatively simple phenomenon: the participation in elections, in
France. We have observed three regularities of turnout rate per municipality (or “commune” of France). (For
each of the twelve elections studied, there is the same choice list for metropolitan France.) The first one is the
standard deviation over the approximately 36200 municipalities of τα (an other way to write the turnout rate).
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Figure 2: Mean value of σα0 inside pi
α
0 intervals, for
the twelve elections. There are 36 intervals, and each
one contains roughly 1000 σα0 . Legends are the same
as in Fig. 1. In magenta, data derive from a binomial
simulation, where Nα+ is obtained by the successes of
Nα independent events with the same probability p for
each municipality α. In this simulation, Nα and p are
real values of the 2007-b election.
The second one involves the constant behavior in time of σα0 (the standard deviation of turnout rates in the
vicinity of a municipality). The third one is about the connection of σα0 with pi
α
0 (the population distribution
in the surroundings of a municipality). These three regularities do not depend on the turnout level, nor on the
nature of the election. These facts incite us to make three predictions for the next 2009 European Parliament
election, within an arbitrary two sigma error bar.
We are convinced that science, fortunately, is not limited to observe empirical regularities. Nevertheless,
knowing regularities allows to make irregularities significant, when they occur (as it is shown in [15]). But,
what matters most is what we try to explain and to use (as we try to do in [15, 16]) some of the encountered
regularities, in order to pursue theoretical investigation.
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Appendix A : Elections studied for the voter turnout
Year List Election Registered voters Turnout rate
1992 binary referendum, Maastricht Treaty 36.6 106 0.713
1994 multiple European Parliament election 37.6 106 0.539
1995 multiple presidential election, first round 38.4 106 0.795
1995 binary presidential election, second round 38.4 106 0.805
1999 multiple European Parliament election 38.4 106 0.478
2000 binary referendum, five year presidential period 38.2 106 0.308
2002 multiple presidential election, first round 39.2 106 0.729
2002 binary presidential election, second round 39.2 106 0.810
2004 multiple European Parliament election 39.9 106 0.434
2005 binary referendum, European constitutional Treaty 39.7 106 0.711
2007 multiple presidential election, first round 41.9 106 0.854
2007 binary presidential election, second round 41.9 106 0.853
Table A-1: Elections studied for their voter turnout. The choice list can be binary or multiple, and is uniform over the
country. The data are limited to metropolitan France.
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